

Overview

December witnessed one of the strongest winter storms to strike the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) in recent decades. The extreme weather conditions, which lasted for four consecutive days, exacerbated already fragile living conditions and livelihoods among large segments of the Palestinian population.

The agriculture sector was one of the hardest hit. The storm resulted in widespread damage across the oPt, especially to greenhouses and animal shelters, as well as in production losses, altogether estimated at US\$69 million. There are serious concerns that these losses may have

increased food insecurity, which prior to the storm already affected over a third of Palestinian households – approximately 1.6 million people.

In the Gaza Strip, the torrential rains put severe pressure on the water infrastructure system, already strained by long overdue repairs and upgrades, as well as by the



HIGHLIGHTS

- The winter storm that stroke the oPt in December exacerbated already fragile living conditions and livelihoods among large segments of the Palestinian population.
- Low-lying areas across the Gaza Strip were flooded, resulting in the temporary evacuation of some 10,000 people, alongside damage to around 21,000 homes.
- Five planning schemes for Palestinian communities in Area C were advanced to the final approval stage; yet, the vast majority of Area C remains off limits for Palestinian development.
- The olive harvest season witnessed fewer Israeli settler attacks than during the previous season, alongside an increase in the number of olive trees vandalized throughout the year.


DECEMBER FIGURES

Palestinian civilians killed (direct conflict)	5
Palestinian civilians injured (direct conflict)	159
Structures demolished in the West Bank	88
People displaced in the West Bank	140

CAP 2013 FUNDING

401 million
requested (US\$)

66.3% funded




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2013
in figures

West Bank:
Palestinian deaths
by Israeli forces



The storm highlighted significant structural gaps, which require policy changes to be addressed, including the removal of the restrictions on the import of building materials to the Gaza Strip, and the halt to demolitions and displacement in Area C of the West Bank

shortage of electricity and fuel used to operate backup generators. The latter has been compounded since June 2013, following the closure of tunnels, through which subsidized fuel from Egypt had been smuggled. Low-lying areas across Gaza were flooded, resulting in the temporary evacuation of some 10,000 people, alongside damage to around 21,000 homes.

Many Palestinian communities across Area C of the West Bank, particularly herders and Bedouins, were also disproportionately impacted by the storm due to the precarious nature of their housing and animal shelters. This vulnerability is also related to the inadequate planning system implemented by the Israeli authorities, which prevents residents from adequately meeting their housing and livelihood needs due to their inability to obtain an Israeli-issued building permit, and results in the demolition of their structures. Over 800 people were forcibly displaced during 2013 in Area C, as a result of these demolitions.

A positive development related to the latter took place during the reporting period, as the Israeli authorities advanced five planning schemes for Palestinian communities in Area C to the final approval stage. These plans, which were developed by the communities in question, would allow residents to build legally and develop public infrastructure. Another 30 similar plans were submitted to the Israeli authorities in the past three years and are under consideration. While the approval of these plans will be a welcome step, they will leave most communities in Area C at risk of demolition and displacement.

An additional concern related to Area C is the access restrictions to agricultural land in the vicinity of Israeli settlements and between the Barrier and the Green Line. These restrictions are particularly acute during the olive harvest season, a key economic, social and cultural event, which came to an end in December. While this season witnessed fewer Israeli settler attacks on Palestinian farmers and their property than during the previous season, throughout the year more than 10,000 olive trees were vandalized by settlers, mostly prior to the start of the season, an over 20 percent increase from last year.

Over the course of the storm and its aftermath, the Palestinian authorities in the West Bank and Gaza, supported by United Nations (UN) agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as by the Israeli authorities, responded in a coordinated manner to the most urgent needs in affected areas. However, the storm highlighted significant structural gaps, which require policy changes to be addressed. These changes include, among others, the removal of the restrictions on the import of building materials to the Gaza Strip, required to repair and upgrade critical infrastructures, and the halt to demolitions and displacement in Area C of the West Bank. Implementation of these policy changes by the Israeli authorities could have an enormous positive impact on the everyday lives of vulnerable Palestinian populations.

WINTER STORM WORSENS LIVING CONDITIONS ACROSS THE OPT

Winter storm Alexa, one of the strongest recorded in recent decades, struck the oPt from 11 to 14 December. It was characterized by strong winds in excess of 80 kilometres per hour, heavy snowfall reaching over two metres in some places, and up to 27 centimetres of rainfall, coupled with exceptionally low temperatures.

The extreme weather conditions exacerbated the already fragile living conditions and livelihoods of large segments of the Palestinian population. The agriculture sector was one of the hardest hit across the oPt resulting in widespread damage to greenhouses and animal shelters, among others. In the Gaza Strip, several areas were severely flooded due to the poor state of the water and sewage infrastructure and equipment, leading to the temporary displacement of thousands.

In the West Bank, hundreds of homes and shelters sustained damage, mostly in vulnerable herding communities in Area C (see also section on Area C Planning below). The governorates most affected by the snow were Hebron, Nablus, Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, while other areas in the northern West Bank (Salfit, in particular) have been affected by heavy rainfall.

The situation triggered a coordinated response by the humanitarian community, involving primarily the Palestinian authorities in both areas, supported by UN agencies and NGOs operating as part of the Humanitarian Country Team and its cluster system, as well as by the Israeli authorities.¹

Agriculture sector sustains significant damage

Large amounts of agricultural infrastructure – central to the livelihoods of Palestinian farmers, herders and fishers – were destroyed across the region by the winter storm.² Greenhouses were destroyed by high winds, crops were flooded by heavy rains, and animal shelters were crushed under metres of snow, leaving livestock exposed to the elements and extreme temperatures. Cumulative losses in agriculture as a result of the storm are estimated at US\$69 million, of which approximately a third reflects the value of assets damaged and two thirds income losses. It is estimated that these losses have further exacerbated food insecurity across the oPt, which prior to the storm was already affecting over a third of Palestinian households – approximately 1.6 million people.

ONLINE SYSTEM STRENGTHENS RESPONSE COORDINATION

Building on the lessons learnt from the response provided to the January 2013 winter storm, UN OCHA, in coordination with Palestinian Authority Governorates, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society and Palestinian Civil Defence, launched an online monitoring and coordination system. The system provides detailed information of the needs generated by the storm across the West Bank, the responses implemented by various actors, and the remaining gaps, by community. It is designed to reduce as much as possible the scope of unmet needs, as well as of duplication in responses.


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This section was contributed by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN

2013
in figures

Gaza Strip:
Palestinian deaths
by Israeli forces


96%



2013 in figures

Israeli casualties by
Palestinians (West Bank
and Israel)

▲
2%



■ Injuries

■ Deaths

“This is the second winter storm so far this year. The humanitarian community here learned significant lessons from the first one which took place in January 2013, allowing us to respond faster and in a more coordinated manner to the plight of Palestinian farmers.”

Cyril Ferrand,
FAO Head of Office

This section was based on inputs provided by the UNICEF-led WASH Cluster

“In four days the region received the amount of rainfall normally collected in four months,” said Cyril Ferrand, FAO Head of Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. “This is the second winter storm so far this year. The humanitarian community here learned significant lessons from the first one which took place in January 2013, allowing us to respond faster and in a more coordinated manner to the plight of Palestinian farmers.”

The State of Palestine Authority’s Ministry of Agriculture estimates that approximately 3,230 dunums of greenhouses have sustained total or partial damage during the storm. The vast majority of the damaged area was concentrated in the Gaza Strip (88 per cent of all greenhouses), particularly in the Rafah governorate.

The livestock sector also sustained heavy damage throughout the oPt, with around 789,000 animals reported dead (281,000 in the West Bank and 508,000 in Gaza), valued at roughly US\$8 million. The majority of these animals are in the poultry sub-sector: in Gaza, 20 per cent of the broilers (chicken raised for meat production) died as a result of the storm. This is of particular concern as 70 per cent of the protein intake in Gaza is from chicken meat. Also in the livestock sector, 173,000 square-metres of animal sheds were reported as damaged, valued at US\$3.4 million.

Production losses, estimated at US\$46 million, have resulted from the reduced agricultural income derived from asset loss, hindered productivity and loss of harvest. In Gaza, production losses are primarily driven by damage to greenhouses and open field crops. The latter were particularly significant, with 56 per cent of the cultivated area (17,385 dunums) damaged, representing US\$25 million lost in income. Similarly, the destruction of high value crops traditionally grown in greenhouses is estimated at US\$11 million.

In the West Bank, production loss is driven by four principle factors; (1) sheep milk (US\$3 million lost); (2) fertilized poultry eggs (used to produce broiler chickens, estimated US\$2.5 million lost), (3) greenhouses (US\$7 million lost); and (4) open fields (US\$4.6 million).

The top priority of partners in the agriculture sector is to prevent the collapse of the sector through the rehabilitation of animal shelters and greenhouses. This response can mitigate the future economic consequences of this crisis, ensuring that many farmers, herders and fishers who are already food insecure do not exit the sector and become aid dependent.

In order to secure resources needed for the emergency response, FAO and Food Security Sector partners have reallocated resources from their ongoing interventions to repair damaged animal shelters and greenhouses worth US\$1.5 million. The remaining gap in resources is to be covered by 14 applications to the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) worth US\$3.3 million (pending approval).

Extensive areas across Gaza flooded

From 8 to 13 December, Gaza water infrastructure had to absorb almost three times the amount of rain that normally falls between October and mid-December. In these six days, Gaza received some 77 per cent of its historical average annual rainfall. This put



Civil Defense staff evacuating people from Al Nafaq area in Gaza City.

severe pressure on the already strained water infrastructure system, affected by long overdue repairs and upgrades, as well as a chronic lack of fuel, exacerbated since June 2013 following the closure of tunnels that served for the smuggling of fuel from Egypt.

Ahead of the forecasted winter storm, local authorities with the support of the international community adopted a series of preventative measures, including the distribution of some 64,000 litres of emergency fuel to the most critical water and sewage installations. However, these measures could not fill most of the gaps affecting this infrastructure. In several areas, the storm water collection points had already been filled with waste water, due to a lack of electricity or fuel to operate the relevant pumps and other equipment. Prior to the storm, at least 11 incidents of sewage spills to open areas were reported as a result of the energy crisis, most notably in the Az-Zaytoun residential area on 13 November.³

Upon the start of the storm, low-lying areas across Gaza flooded, as a result of the failure of storm water collection points to discharge the water fast enough into the sea. The Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU) indicated that flooding incidents occurred in at least 25 locations in all five Gaza governorates. Worst hit was the Sheikh Radwan neighbourhood of Gaza City, where a residential area of 250 dunums, with some 1,000 households, was flooded. Most water pumping facilities and storm water lagoons were

At the peak of the storm, approximately 10,000 people were evacuated from their homes and forced to relocate to temporary shelters or take refuge with relatives. The vast majority were able to return by the end of the storm.

SUPPORTING DISPLACED CHILDREN

A shortage of warm clothing was identified as one of the major needs resulting from the winter storm, particularly among children, which constituted over half of those displaced. This gap was addressed through a generous contribution of the Bank of Palestine that provided UNICEF with US\$50,000, half of which was allocated to the purchase of clothes for children, while the rest was used to purchase hygiene kits. Additionally, the Palestinian Centre for Democracy and Civil Rights (PCDCR) dispatched its five Emergency Psychosocial Support Teams to conduct emergency home visits in the most affected areas, including temporary shelters in schools.⁴

flooded and incapable of operating. Flood water levels in the area reached 6.5 metres at the height of the storm.

At the peak of the storm, approximately 10,000 people were evacuated from their homes and forced to relocate to temporary shelters or take refuge with relatives. The vast majority were able to return by the end of the storm. The flood water also caused damage to homes, including at least 21,000 homes which need major repairs.

The most common challenges to water and sewage treatment facilities as a result of the storm included: damage to generators and electrical panels, breakdown of pumping equipment, a shortage of spare parts and increased needs for maintenance and upgrade of equipment due to over-use. This further compounded the already limited capacity of CMWU due to the sharp decline in electricity supply since 1 November, following the shutdown of the Gaza Power Plant, and subsequently the damage sustained to the electricity feeder lines from both Egypt and Israel during the storm. Rolling power outages lasted for at least 16 hours per day during the period of bad weather.

At the beginning of the storm, the Israeli authorities loaned four mobile pumps to the CMWU, which played a pivotal role in the response provided to the flooding. Additionally, CMWU constructed a temporary storm water lagoon next to Sheikh Radwan lagoon to

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Case-study provided by EducAid, through a local partner, the Social Development Forum⁵

THE STORM AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: THE CASE OF FRASHA

Persons with disabilities were among the hardest hit by the winter storm, particularly in the flooded areas of the Gaza Strip that had to be evacuated.

Frasha is a 29-year-old university student living in North Gaza with her mother and four brothers. She is diagnosed with hemiplegia, which entails impairment in her legs and left hand, that appeared three years ago as a result of a nervous breakdown.

Despite some preventative preparations, the day following the beginning of the storm, Frasha and her family awoke to find their home flooded, with water coming in from the windows, walls and the ceiling: "We woke up so scared. My brothers immediately moved away from the wet mattresses and rushed to save the furniture. I remained on the wet floor, waiting for someone to help me move. It took me some time to understand what was going on and to stand up... People came by, and the police also came to help us... we even brought sand and put it around the house to protect us a bit from the heavy rains."

After four days of continuous hard work, the water was pumped out of the house: "Until this moment our house is still wet. We cannot sleep in our beds. We borrowed mattresses and blankets from our relatives and all sleep in the kitchen. I cannot leave the house unless it is really necessary because my clothes and shoes are wet. Because of my disability, I cannot sit on the floor easily. Whenever I walk inside my house, I have to be careful because water is still seeping out of the tiles, so I might slip."

Nearly seven per cent of the Palestinian population in the oPt, or approximately 305,000 people, suffer from a disability and face particular challenges in accessing livelihood opportunities as well as adequate health, education and social services.⁶

THE STORM'S IMPACT ON GAZAN WOMEN AND GIRLS

UN Women, in collaboration with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Aisha Association for the Protection of Women and Children in Gaza, conducted a series of focus group discussions (FGD) with women, about the impact of the storm on women. Six such FGDs were conducted in various locations across Gaza on 18 December 2013, with specific focus on the worst affected areas. Among other findings, the report highlighted that gender-specific restrictions remain intact in context of an emergency. The social expectations on women to comply with strict social codes regarding dress, mixing with men, and mobility remain unshaken, presenting women with added challenges especially in the context of the loss of their houses and privacy. In addition, the discussions showed that women had little access to information and were generally reliant on men for information on available assistance. Fulla from the Zarka community stated that “I know that I need to contact an ambulance or the civil defense department in case of emergency, but I do not know how to contact them”.⁷

divert water out of residential areas, while other lagoons absorbed water well beyond their capacity. Extracting water from the lagoons into the sea with heavy-duty pumps continued throughout December and beyond.


WASH cluster members supported the CMWU with the response to the storm, including through coordination and complementing assessments, as well as with the provision of a long list of non-food items (mainly tarpaulin, nylon, blankets, mattresses but also mats, gas stoves, kitchen sets and tents, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, UNRWA), hygiene kits (UNICEF, Oxfam and UNRWA) and pumps (Action Against Hunger). UNRWA provided 64,000 litres of fuel (funded by Turkey) ahead of the storm and 90,000 litres (funded by the ERF) immediately after the storm, to guarantee the continuity of services of crucial water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure. The UN also facilitated the request for and the entrance of the four pumps loaned by Israel.

Authorities and organizations in the WASH sector have identified a number of measures required to address the remaining effects of the flooding and prepare for similar emergencies in the future. Short term measures include fuel procurement for WASH facilities and rehabilitation of storm water lagoons. In a second stage, stand-by pumps and other equipment need to be procured and further repairs conducted, alongside the upgrade of existing pumping stations and the construction of new ones. Addressing the long term WASH needs in the Gaza Strip requires large-scale infrastructure projects, the implementation of which is being delayed due a range of impediments including access restrictions, lack of funding and political constraints stemming from restrictions on agencies' contacts with the de facto authorities.

2013
in figures

Palestinian
Injuries by Isr
Forces

10%



Addressing the long term WASH needs in the Gaza Strip requires large-scale infrastructure projects, delayed due to access restrictions, lack of funding and political constraints stemming from restrictions on agencies' contacts with the de facto authorities

This section is based on inputs provided by UN-Habitat

PLANNING SCHEMES FOR FIVE AREA C COMMUNITIES AT FINAL STAGE OF APPROVAL

The vast majority of Area C remains off limits for Palestinian development


The Israeli Civil Administration, which is responsible for planning and zoning in Area C of the West Bank, has recently published for public review planning schemes for five Palestinian communities (combined population of some 2,500) located in Area C.⁸ If no objections are submitted within 60 days, the plans should enter into force within a short period of time. Such an approval would entail tangible benefits to the communities in question, including the ability to obtain a permit so they can build legally for housing and livelihood-related purposes, the possibility to develop public infrastructure on land designated for that purpose, and the integration and connection of the communities to utility networks, such as roads, water, electricity and sewerage.

This development is part of a larger initiative involving the preparation of planning schemes for most Palestinian communities across Area C, by the communities themselves, with the support of the Palestinian Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), the International Peace and Cooperation Centre (IPCC, a Palestinian NGO), UN-Habitat and international donors. So far, a total of 35 such plans have been officially submitted to

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
THE CASE OF IMNEIZEL

Imneizel is one of the five communities about to have a new planning scheme approved. It is a small Palestinian community of around 400 inhabitants situated in the south of the Hebron Governorate, 1.5 km from the Green Line and entirely in Area C. The built up area is about 73 dunums (18.25 acres). Once approved, the plan will remove the threat of displacement and demolitions and provide a legal framework for the development of much needed infrastructure such as connection to the water and electricity networks, basic roads, sewerage, a school, health care facility, youth centre and kindergarten.



2013 in figures

Structures demolished



SUPPORTING ADEQUATE PLANNING

The Planning Support Programme (PSP), run by UN-Habitat, in partnership with the Ministry of Local Government and the IPCC, aims at improving the resilience of Palestinian communities in Area C through sustainable local development, greater building rights and access to basic services. Specific objectives include:

1. Effective Planning - technically coherent and in line with Palestinian national needs;
2. Capacity Development of both local and central-level Palestinian authorities; and
3. Coordinated Advocacy based on comprehensive information and monitoring.

The PSP also envisions the preparation of community-driven development frameworks for the economic hinterland areas of villages and development schemes for functional clusters of Palestinian communities. The purpose of this work is planning for the productive use of the land, protecting high quality agricultural land or areas of landscape quality, considering transport linkages and the potential future economic development pattern.

the ICA and are at various stages of consideration, and over 60 additional plans are being prepared by the communities.


A humanitarian profiling exercise led by OCHA that was recently completed, indicates that there are 533 Palestinian residential areas throughout Area C, some of which are part of a larger locality located in Area A and B.⁹ Only 14 per cent of these residential areas (75 communities) currently have a planning scheme initiated and approved by the ICA. The combined area of these 75 plans is approximately 18,000 dunums, or 0.5 per cent of Area C.¹⁰ Unlike the plans prepared under the initiative mentioned above, these plans were prepared by the ICA without consultation with the affected communities and largely fail to meet the basic needs of the residents; in many cases, some of the built up areas located on the margins of communities are excluded from the plans.

The lack of adequate planning has been a major driver of vulnerability for the people of Area C communities, undermining access to livelihoods and services, and leading to the loss of property and forced displacement of people, as a result of the demolition of structures built without permits. Official information made recently available through a Freedom of Information Law petition by the Israeli NGO Bimkom, indicates that, since 1988, the ICA has issued 12,570 demolition orders targeting Palestinian structures without permits (one order can target multiple structures) in what is today Area C.¹¹ In 2013 alone, OCHA recorded the Israeli authorities' demolition of 565 Palestinian-owned homes and livelihood structures in Area C, displacing over 800 people. Bedouin and herding communities were among the hardest hit, with three communities displaced in their entirety.¹²

Taking into account the devastating impact of demolitions and displacement, as well as of the inability of people to meet their basic housing and livelihood needs, the expected approval of the five planning schemes will provide a much needed relief to the affected

2013
in figures

People displaced
as a result of
demolitions



The plans submitted and under preparation only include privately-owned Palestinian land, thus not affecting the current Israeli policy under which, public land covering over 60 per cent of Area C is exclusively allocated to Israeli settlements and the military.

communities. The fact that these plans were submitted by the communities themselves is also setting a valuable precedent.

Despite this progress, the remaining gaps in terms of planning needs are significant. Even if all plans submitted to the ICA in recent years would be approved, many more Area C communities will remain uncovered. Additionally, the plans submitted and under preparation only include privately-owned Palestinian land, thus not affecting the current Israeli policy under which, public (also known as “state”) land is exclusively allocated to Israeli settlements and the military. Public land encompasses over 60 per cent of Area C. In addition to humanitarian vulnerability, the lack of access to the vast majority of Area C by Palestinians has been identified as a major factor preventing economic development, in areas such as agriculture, mineral extraction, tourism and infrastructure.¹³

OVERVIEW OF THE 2013 OLIVE HARVEST SEASON

The 2013 olive harvest season ended in December. The annual olive harvest is a key economic, social and cultural event for Palestinians. Almost 51 per cent of the agricultural land in the oPt is planted with eight million olive trees, the vast majority (94 per cent) in the West Bank. The olive oil industry makes up 25 per cent¹⁴ of the agricultural income of the oPt and estimates suggest that about 100,000 families depend to some extent on the annual olive harvest for their livelihoods.¹⁵ The value added of the associated olive oil industry comes to an average US\$5.4 million per year.¹⁶

Olive production in the oPt is cyclical, with a good (high yield) year followed by a bad (low yield) year. Olive production can range widely from 27,000 tons in a bad year to 170,000 tons in a good year, and olive oil production varies accordingly, between 6,000 and 34,000 tons, respectively.⁴ The Ministry of Agriculture is projecting a yield of 14,000 metric tons of oil for this year’s harvest, compared to 18,000 metric tons in 2012.

The approval of the plans would entail tangible benefits to the communities in question, including the ability to obtain a permit so they can build legally, the possibility to develop public infrastructure, and the integration and connection of the communities to utility networks, such as roads, water, electricity and sewerage.



Photo by: A. Aguilar/EAPPI

Olive orchards require all year-round maintenance and restricted access affects the productivity of olive trees. In the West Bank, communities with olive groves located between the Barrier and the Green Line and in the vicinity of Israeli settlements continue to face challenges carrying out essential activities such as ploughing, pruning, and fertilizing, thus undermining the quality and quantity of the yield.


In the Gaza Strip, since the Egyptian-mediated ceasefire understanding between Israel and Hamas in November 2012, access to farming land along the perimeter fence with Israel has increased. However, the parameters of the new regime were never officially communicated, leading to continuing uncertainty regarding security of access. Many Gaza farmers have been able to routinely access areas up to 300 metres from the fence for the first time in years, but this has had little impact on the olive harvest. This is due to the fact that olive trees in the areas adjacent to the fence have been uprooted in land levelling operations regularly conducted by Israeli forces citing security reasons.

Limited access to private lands near settlements

In the West Bank, Palestinian farmers whose olive groves are located close to or within the environs of Israeli settlements and settlement outposts continue to face restrictions accessing their land. For the 2013 olive season, as in previous years, the Israeli army deployed additional forces to protect farmers from settler violence and designated limited periods when, following “prior coordination”, farmers were permitted to access their olive groves in the vicinity of some 55 settlements. These coordination arrangements related mostly to Palestinian land now encircled by settlement fences, and to areas where settler violence is recurrent. During the harvest period, the Protection Cluster undertook

coordination of protective presence initiatives by humanitarian and human rights organizations (see box) aimed at supporting Palestinian access to olive groves.


Despite the prior coordination arrangements, the organizations providing a protective presence reported incidents of settler-related violence taking place within the allocated time schedule, including physical attacks, intimidation and damage to property and trees. In several cases, upon accessing their land, farmers discovered damage to property, trespassing and the illegal takeover of land by settlers. In other instances, Israeli forces ordered the Palestinian farmers off their land,



While the prior-coordination system, alongside the deployment of additional Israeli forces in “friction areas” have reduced clashes and settler attacks on farmers while they are working, it has proven largely ineffective in preventing vandalism or theft of olive trees throughout the rest of the year

2013 in figures

Settler incidents resulting in Palestinian injuries or property damage



Of 211 investigative files opened by the Israeli Police following complaints submitted by Palestinians regarding damage to trees, only four ended in indictments. Some 166 files were closed on grounds of “perpetrator unknown”

ADDRESSING SETTLER VIOLENCE THROUGH PROTECTIVE PRESENCE

As part of the response to settler-related violence, the Protection Cluster, through the OHCHR-chaired Core Group on Settler Violence, coordinated the presence of humanitarian organizations to provide support and protection to Palestinian farmers affected by settler violence and access restrictions during the olive harvest season. The initiative involved 12 organizations, including three Palestinian NGOs, one Israeli NGO, five international organizations and three UN agencies, which provided protective presence in 84 communities.

Initial assessments indicate that protective presence contributed to, and in some cases played a critical role in, preventing settler attacks and mitigating the impact of those cases that did occur. Overall, the involved organizations documented 22 settler-related incidents, some of which served to trigger further responses, including legal support in filing complaints, psychosocial responses, further coordination for access-related matters, intensified protective presence, and material responses.

“The presence of organizations is very important. It helps the farmers, especially when internationals and credible organizations are present. It makes us feel more secure. Any help, as small as it may be, is important and positive,” said Salam, a farmer from Jubbet Adh Dihb village in Bethlehem. His family had recently won a court case, following which were able to access it for the first time in 10 years.¹⁹

on the grounds that it was for their own safety, resulting in farmers losing time from the already restricted, allocated schedule. Instances of settler intimidation and attacks against Israeli soldiers, journalists, and protective presence actors were also reported. Overall, the “prior coordination” regime places the onus on farmers whose access to their own lands is restricted, rather than enforcing the rule of law on Israeli settlers.

In total during the 2013 olive harvest, OCHA recorded 32 settler attacks resulting in property damage or injuries, down from the 51 recorded during the olive harvest in 2012.¹⁸ However, the number of trees and saplings damaged during this year’s olive harvest by settlers (1,492) increased considerably compared to 2012 (986). In addition, while the prior-coordination system, alongside the deployment of additional Israeli forces in “friction areas” have reduced clashes and settler attacks on farmers while they are working, it has proven largely ineffective in preventing vandalism or theft of olive trees throughout the rest of the year. In total, during 2013, 10,142 trees were reported burned, uprooted, or otherwise vandalized, including in areas adjacent to settlements, at times when Palestinian access was restricted, compared to 8,259 trees during 2012.

Lack of adequate law enforcement vis-à-vis settler violence in general, and attacks against olive trees in particular, remains of concern. This relates to gaps in terms of preventive measures, as well as to measures aimed at holding perpetrators accountable. According to the Israeli organization Yesh Din between 2005 and 2013, of 211 investigative files opened by the Israeli Police following complaints submitted by Palestinians regarding damage to trees, only four ended in indictments. Some 166 files were closed on grounds of “perpetrator unknown”, signifying that the investigators had failed to locate and

identify suspects. Furthermore, various organizations reported the unwillingness and reluctance of many Palestinian farmers to file complaints in connection to settler related incidents, stating that filing complaints at Israeli police stations are “useless” and “a waste of time”.

Olive groves isolated by the Barrier: the permit/prior coordination and gate regime


For farmers who own olive groves in the land behind the Barrier, access is dependent on obtaining a special permit from, or performing “prior coordination” with the Israeli authorities. For those farmers granted access to their groves behind the Barrier by permit or prior coordination, passage is restricted to Barrier gates and checkpoints. Most of the crossings along the Barrier are only open during the olive harvest period and only for a limited amount of time during those days, prohibiting year-round access. In total, as of this year’s olive harvest, there were 89 Barrier crossings: 81 gates and eight checkpoints, the latter used not to access agricultural land, but by residents of the “Seam Zone” to reach workplaces and essential services in the remainder of the West Bank. Of the gates designated for agricultural access, only nine open daily; an additional nine open for some day(s) during the week and during the olive season; and the majority, 63, open during the olive season only.

Despite the announced increase in the allocation of permits during the olive harvest, many applications were rejected, mainly due to “security reasons” or on the grounds of insufficient proof of “connection to the land”. The northern West Bank contains most of the agricultural gates (39), including the nine crossings which open on a daily basis. Thirty-five of the gates require permits: the approval rate for Barrier permits for the whole of 2013 varied from just over a third in Salfit governorate, 46 per cent in Tulkarm governorate, to two-thirds in Qalqiliya governorate.²⁰ This data is consistent with figures over the last three years which show an approximately 50 per cent rate of permit approval/rejection in the northern West Bank.

Productivity data collected by OCHA from a number of farmers in the northern West Bank over the last five years show that olive trees in the “Seam Zone” have an approximately 60 per cent reduction in yield compared to their equivalents on the “Palestinian” side of the Barrier, where essential activities such as ploughing, pruning, fertilizing and pest and weed management can be carried out on a regular basis.

In the Ramallah area, where all of the gates are seasonal (opening according to the type of crop/tree in each area), 12 of the 18 gates operate on a permit system. According to figures obtained from the Palestinian District Coordination Liaison (DCL) office, a total of 1,153 people applied for permits, of which 62 per cent were approved, compared to 79 per cent in 2012; 38 per cent (435) were denied this year, primarily for unspecified security reasons.

In Hebron, where access to land in the ‘Seam Zone’ is only permitted during the olive harvest, seven Barrier gates operated through prior coordination, and all 850 farmers who applied receiving permits. However, farmers who had suffered repeated refusal in the past were discouraged from re-applying, in addition to a reduced rate of applications




Olive trees in the “Seam Zone” have an approximately 60 per cent reduction in yield compared to their equivalents on the “Palestinian” side of the Barrier.

2013
in figures

Rafah crossing:
passengers in both
directions

28%



There has been a decrease in the number of access incidents during the last 2013 quarter largely due to a reduction in the movement of humanitarian personnel due to an ongoing strike of UNRWA local staff in the West Bank, as well as official UN holidays

because of the low yield. In the Bethlehem governorate, two gates opened using the 'prior coordination' system, with approximately 200 farmers accessing their land, without incident. Of concern, all 50 farmers from the Wadi Shami area of Bethlehem who applied for permits to access their land within the Jerusalem municipal boundary had their applications rejected.


■ QUARTERLY UPDATE ON HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Less staff affected by access incidents

The number of access incidents affecting humanitarian organizations operating in the oPt, as well as the number of staff affected in these incidents, significantly decreased this quarter (70 incidents affecting 291 staff) compared to the last quarter (112 incidents

affecting 765 staff). Incidents this quarter resulted in the loss of 27 working days. The decrease is largely related to a reduction in the movement of humanitarian personnel due to an ongoing strike of UNRWA local staff in the West Bank, as well as official UN holidays. Yet, 2013 as a whole, witnessed a 20 per cent decrease in the number of incidents, compared to 2012. This decrease can be attributed to a moderate improvement at some of the checkpoints, alongside increased avoidance of "problematic checkpoints" by the choice of detours and longer routes.

Number of access incidents



Demands for search of UN vehicles, in contravention of the 1946 Convention on UN Privileges and Immunities, continue to be the main cause of incidents affecting UN staff. Over half of all incidents reported in the fourth quarter resulted from such demands, and nearly 90 per cent of these took place when passing through Barrier checkpoints controlling access to the Jerusalem area. By contrast, almost half of all incidents affecting NGO staff involved delays at crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip, controlled either by Israeli or Gaza local authorities.

Positive trends in movement of staff to and from Gaza

The number of permit applications submitted to the Israeli authorities on behalf of UN national staff to enter or leave the Gaza Strip increased this quarter (from 293 to 325 applications), while the approval rate remained at around 76 per cent, similar to the yearly average for 2013. The processing time has been significantly reduced from 22 days on average in 2012 to 9 days in 2013.

Unlike UN international staff, entry of international staff of international NGOs (INGOs) to the Gaza Strip requires a permit by the Israeli authorities. As in the previous quarter,

about 85 per cent of the applications for such permits this quarter were approved on time for scheduled travel. This is well above last year's quarterly average rate of approval (67 per cent). So is the average processing time of applications; 12 days in 2013 compared to 22 days in 2012.

In response to the intermittent closures and reduction of operations at the Egyptian-controlled Rafah crossing, the Israeli authorities continued easing some of the travel restrictions this quarter in order to accommodate an increase in the number of travellers (in particular patients, some categories of students, foreign and dual nationals, as well as Palestinian ID holders working for international organizations), who would have otherwise travelled through Rafah, to leave Gaza via Erez. This resulted in a nine per cent increase in the monthly average of people exiting Gaza through Erez in the fourth quarter (6,715) of 2013, compared to the third quarter (6,112). Despite this easing, the vast majority of the Gaza population remains ineligible for exit permits via the Erez crossing.

Access and movement through Erez crossing was temporarily disrupted in mid-December as a result of damage to the crossing following the harsh winter storm that hit the oPt, causing floods, power outages and rapid deterioration in the already poor humanitarian situation in Gaza. In the most immediate period following the storm, Israeli authorities facilitated medical evacuations and other humanitarian movement through Kerem Shalom, gradually restoring movement through Erez as the repair work progressed.


Access constraints by the Gaza local authorities continue

The operations of INGOs in the Gaza Strip have also been continuously impeded by Gaza's local authorities. There remain outstanding issues regarding the request of the authorities to collect VAT and income tax from such organizations and their staff, affecting the processing of applications for exit permits for the national staff of some INGOs. The "no contact" policy of some donors, which prohibits contact with the Hamas authorities has also affected the ability of these organizations to resolve these issues. The abovementioned tension is narrowing the operational independence of some organizations and, at times, restricts on-going humanitarian operations.

West Bank: limited access to East Jerusalem and closed military areas

Access of local humanitarian staff to East Jerusalem remains restricted by a permit regime. Out of 110 permit applications for UN national staff to enter East Jerusalem during the last quarter, 55 per cent were approved on time, while most of the rest remain pending. The inconsistent trends across UN agencies in terms of rates of acceptance remain, with some agencies having all or nearly all of their permit applications approved, while others, including OCHA, encountered 100 per cent rejection of applications.

This quarter also witnessed additional impediments to humanitarian access to other vulnerable populations in the West Bank, such as those living in closed military areas. Of particular concern have been the constraints on the access of UN and NGO humanitarian staff to a closed military area in southern Hebron (Firing Zone 918).²¹ The Israeli military



In response to the intermittent closures and reduction of operations at the Rafah crossing, the Israeli authorities continued easing some of the travel restrictions through the Erez crossing in order to accommodate an increase in the number of travellers


has refused to guarantee the staff's safety, including at times during which there is no military training taking place, resulting in reduced access to highly vulnerable communities in this area. However, by the end of December, representatives of the Palestinian communities reached an agreement with the Israeli authorities that would facilitate the access of humanitarian organizations within the framework of the response to the winter storm.

One Gaza project approved by Israel

One UN infrastructure project (solar energy for public services) worth US\$0.5 million was approved by Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) this quarter compared to 13 projects for a total of US\$2.5 million of UN reconstruction and community development projects in Gaza that were approved in the previous quarter. This particular project was approved in a record time of two months since its submission, compared with an average of 12 months recorded since 2010.

The need for an Israeli approval stems from the longstanding ban on the import of basic building materials, classified by the Israeli authorities as "Dual-Use Items", except for projects of international organizations that were subject to lengthy approval process by COGAT. While in December 2012 Israel began allowing the entry of limited amounts of construction materials for commercial uses, this as well as the import of materials for UN projects came to an end in October 2013, following the discovery of a reinforced tunnel dug from Gaza into southern Israel. The import of construction materials for international projects only resumed in early December 2013.

The local authorities in Gaza have continued to demand that INGO staff apply individually for exit permits, while rejecting annual lists provided by the INGOs, further complicating the situation generated by the "no contact" policy of some donors



End notes

1. For a more comprehensive overview of the storm's impact see OCHA, Situation Reports, 14 and 16 December.
2. For further details see FAO, Winter Storm Alexa Damage Assessment and Response, January 2014.
3. For further details on this survey see OCHA, The Humanitarian Bulletin, November 2013.
4. Information provided by UNICEF
5. EducAid, an Italian NGO, has been working with persons with disabilities for more than 10 years in the Gaza Strip. Currently, it is cooperating with a range of local organizations on capacity building, conducting activities for women with disabilities, including media, research, awareness raising and advocacy.
6. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), National Disability Survey, 2011.
7. Information provided by UN Women
8. The communities are: Harmala in the Bethlehem Governorate, Imneizel and Tuwani in the Hebron Governorate, Ras Tira/Daba'a in Qalqilya Governorate, and Ti'nnek in Jenin Governorate.
9. Selected findings of this profiling, including the estimated number of residents in Area C, will be issued during February 2014. For further details on this survey see OCHA, The Humanitarian Bulletin, October 2013.
10. Information about current planning schemes was provided to OCHA by the Israeli NGO Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights.
11. Ibid.
12. A fourth Bedouin community entirely displaced during 2013 (Tel Addassa) was located in East Jerusalem.
13. See the World Bank, Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy, October 2013.
14. This includes the value of picked olives and processed olive oil (PCBS data 2003-2010 averages).
15. This includes 80,000 households who own land holdings containing olive trees according to the PCBS, WFP, FAO and UNRWA Socioeconomic and Food Security (SEFSec) Survey 2012, in addition to 20,000 waged labourers and households who work under share cropping arrangements during the annual olive harvest.
16. Calculations made by FAO WBG's Food Security Unit, based on PCBS agricultural statistics over various years.
17. PCBS, Olive Press Survey 2012.
18. This includes incidents of damage to property only discovered during the olive harvest, when farmers had access to their groves, but which were perpetrated earlier.
19. From a testimony collected by the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI).
20. Salfit governorate: 590 out of 1,809 applications; Tulkarm governorate: 4,915 out of 10,630 applications; Qalqilya governorate: 9,935 out of 14,914 applications.
21. For further background on this specific area see OCHA, The Massafer Yatta Case Study, May 2013.

Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables

Conflict-related casualties and violence¹

Direct Israeli-Palestinian conflict related casualties	2011	2012	2013											
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec

Palestinian deaths

Gaza	108	264	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	2	11
West Bank	17	8	4	0*	2	2	0	0	1	5	0	3	6	3	27
Total	125	272	6	3	2	3	0	0	1	6	1	4	9	5	38
Of whom are civilians ²	62	136	6	3	2	2	0	0	1	6	1	2	6	5	32
Of whom are female	3	23	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Palestinian injuries

Gaza	468	1834	13	10	5	4	1	2	2	7	5	1	5	28	83
West Bank	1647	3175	250	756	488	652	428	122	136	130	369	104	315	131	3881
Total	2115	5009	263	766	493	656	429	124	138	137	374	105	320	159	3964
Of whom are civilians	2054	n/a	263	766	492	655	429	124	138	137	373	104	320	158	3959
Of whom are female	151	n/a	8	13	14	10	40	8	12	4	10	4	15	20	158

Israeli deaths

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	11	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	4
Of whom are civilians	11	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Of whom are female	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Israeli injuries

Israel, Gaza and West Bank	122	345	6	24	21	17	33	1	11	5	9	15	5	4	151
Of whom are civilians	56	60	3	11	13	4	15	1	8	0	5	9	2	3	74
Of whom are female	3	7	0	1	1	2	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	10

*Two Palestinians died of injuries they sustained by Israeli forces during the second intifada and by Israeli settlers in 2005

** Figures include those provided by the Ministry of Health in Gaza during the recent Israeli offensive on Gaza (14-21 November)

*** Figures by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**** The number of injured Israeli soldiers is provided by COGAT

Tunnel-related casualties ³	2011	2012	2013												
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Deaths	36	11	6	2	2	1	3	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	17
Injuries	54	18	6	0	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14

Israeli-settler related incidents resulting in casualties or property damage

	2011	2012	2013												
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Incidents leading to Palestinian casualties ⁴	120	98	7	8	11	17	10	7	6	4	8	9	4	3	94
Incidents leading to Palestinian property/land damages	291	268	17	19	24	38	45	29	23	16	29	36	24	6	306
Subtotal: incidents affecting Palestinians	411	366	24	27	35	55	55	36	29	20	37	45	27	9	399
Incidents leading to Israeli Casualties	23	35	2	1	9	4	5	1	2	0	4	4	3	3	38
Incidents leading to Israeli Property/land damages ⁵	13	15	2	0	0	1	0	3	0	2	0	0	1	3	12
Subtotal: incidents affecting settlers	36	50	4	1	9	5	5	4	2	2	4	4	4	6	50

Civilian Palestinians killed or injured by unexploded ordnance in Gaza

		2011	2012	2013												
		Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	April	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
Adult	Injured	7	12	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
	Killed	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Child	Injured	17	19	5	5	6	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	
	Killed	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
Grand Total		27	34	7	6	6	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	26

Child Protection

Number of Palestinian children killed - direct conflict

	2011	2012	2013												
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
West Bank	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	4
Gaza Strip	11	44	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1

Number of Palestinian children injured - direct conflict

West Bank	308	427	36	146	162	289	188	34	22	35	130	25	132	33	1232
Gaza Strip	125	105	3	3	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	10

Number of Israeli children killed - direct conflict

oPt	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Israel	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Israeli children injured - direct conflict

oPt	0	3	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6
Israel	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Number of Palestinian children held in detention by Israeli authorities

In Israel and oPt	192 monthly average	198 monthly average	219	236	236	238	223	193	195	180	179	159	NA	NA	211 monthly average
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Number of Palestinian children displaced by demolitions

West Bank, inc Ej	618	474	157	23	5	38	41	58	17	46	53	19	29	75	558
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Number of incidents resulting in the disruption of schools¹⁹

oPt	na	321	1	7	4	8	5	4	1	2	15	NA	NA	NA	47
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Source: OCHA, DWG, Defence for Children International, Israel Palestine Working Group on grave violations affecting children in armed conflict

Access

Access to healthcare - Gaza

	2011	2012	2013												
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.
Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez Crossing ¹⁵	872	777	796	907	882	1155	1117	1165	1299	1023	1303	1420	NA	NA	1106.7
of which approved	721	719	738	836	762	957	900	985	1106	932	1182	1314	NA	NA	1043.1
of which denied	19	7	2	2	1	0	1	0	7	3	5	11	NA	NA	3.2
of which delayed ¹⁶	83	17	56	69	119	198	216	180	186	88	116	95	NA	NA	134

Source: WHO

Movement of humanitarian staff, West Bank

	2011	2012	2013												
	2011 Monthly Average	2012 monthly ave	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.
Incidents of delayed or denied access at WB checkpoint ¹⁷	38	37.5	34	69	51	24	51	30	33	34	45	30	23	17	40.1
Of which occurred at Jerusalem checkpoint	22	21	18	52	33	10	32	15	12	19	22	10	8	5	22.3
Number of staff days lost due to checkpoint incidents	25	21	8	29	17	6	16	4	8	24	60	13	13	3	18.5

Source: OCHA

Search and Arrest

	2011	2012	2013												
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.
Search Campaigns (West Bank)	349	338	313	287	282	338	370	461	242	333	252	281	435	250	316
Palestinians detained (West Bank)	262	283	296	411	421	367	459	472	298	341	416	314	529	262	380

Source: OCHA


Palestinians under Israeli custody (occupation related)⁶

	2011	2012	2013												
	Monthly Average	Monthly Average	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Mon. Ave.
Total as of the end of the month	5326	4,451	4593	4713	4764	4748	4801	4827	4828	4762	4806	4753	NA	NA	4227
of whom are women	26	7	10	10	11	14	16	14	11	12	12	5	NA	NA	10
of whom are administrative detainees ⁷	240	245	159	169	164	155	147	137	134	134	135	140	NA	NA	132
of whom are detained until the conclusion of legal proceedings	633	897	1069	1118	1196	1216	1194	1150	1219	1295	1299	1299	NA	NA	1062

Source: Israeli Prison Service (through B'Tselem)

Demolition of Structures


Structures demolished⁸



	2011	2012	2013												
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
of which in Area C	571	540	120	11	2	40	58	69	32	20	93	13	19	88	565
of which in East Jerusalem	42	64	21	3	1	6	11	3	1	37	2	8	6	0	99
Grand Total	613	604	141	14	3	46	69	72	33	57	95	21	25	88	664


*20 are in Area B

People Displaced due to demolitions or evictions⁹



	2011	2012	2013												
	Total	Total	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
of whom were displaced in Area C	1006	815	247	6	0	40	32	101	48	33	108	7	43	140	805
of whom were displaced in East Jerusalem	88	71	14	40	10	24	59	30	0	63	6	34	18	0	298
Grand Total	1094	886	261	46	10	64	91	131	48	96	114	41	61	140	1103









Truckloads of goods entering Gaza from Israel



Source: Palestinian Ministry of National Economy, Gaza

* Due to historical differences in the modality of transfer, to preserve the uniformity of the data, figures do not include truckloads carrying fuel.

Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): CAP 2012 and 2013

Cluster	CAP 2012		CAP 2013	
	Total request in million \$	% of funds received	Total request in million \$	% of funds received
 Agriculture	24,921,339	61.4%	31,665,733	42.1%
 Cash for Work and Cash Assistance	95,559,928	35.5%	70,481,900	48.3%
Cluster not yet specified	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
 Coordination and Support Services	21,167,518	95.7%	21,295,427	93.9%
 Education	16,662,763	54.7%	22,408,092	38.2%
 Food Security	170,513,876	83.0%	160,052,254	78.7%
 Health and Nutrition	20,742,170	86.6%	22,536,007	53.8%
 Protection	46,131,077	73.8%	53,093,279	63.9%
 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	24,208,531	55.8%	19,307,048	32.9%
Total	419,907,202	72.0%	400,839,740	66.3%

Source: Financial Tracking System (FTS)

Monthly Indicator Notes and Clarifications

Casualties

1. **Conflict-related casualties:** includes all casualties that occurred in violent incidents immediately related to the Israeli occupation and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as military operations, search and arrest campaigns, clashes during demonstrations, attacks involving Israeli settlers, etc. These figures exclude other related casualties such as those in the context of access delays, the explosion of unexploded ordnance, reckless handling of weapons, collapse of tunnels, and internal Palestinian violence.
2. **Civilians:** includes people who, according to the information available at the time of publication, did not fulfill a “continuous combatant function” as part of an organized armed group, regardless of the circumstances of their injury or killing. Figures in this category should not be considered comprehensive, as unconfirmed or disputed cases are excluded.
3. **Tunnel related casualties:** figures in this category may overlap with those under conflict-related casualties, as it includes casualties in the context of Israeli attacks targeting tunnels, as well as those resulting from tunnel collapses and other accidents.

Israeli settler-related violence

4. **Incidents resulting in casualties:** includes all violent incidents involving Israeli settlers and Palestinians, including those in which the injury was caused by a member of the Israeli security forces during an intervention in such an incident.
5. **Incidents resulting in property damage/losses:** *ibid.*

Search and Arrest

6. **Palestinians in Israeli custody:** includes all Palestinians from the oPt held by the Israeli authorities at the end of each month, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, in connection to an offense related to the Israeli occupation and classified by the Israeli authorities as a “security detainee/prisoner”. Therefore it excludes Palestinians held in connection to a “regular” criminal offense.
7. **Administrative detainees:** Palestinians held by the Israeli authorities without charge or trial, allegedly for preventive purposes.

Demolitions

8. **Structures demolished:** includes all Palestinian-owned structures in the oPt demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of their specific use (residential or non-residential) or the grounds on which the demolition was carried out (lack of building permit, military operation or punishment).
9. **People displaced due to demolitions:** includes all persons that were living in structures demolished by the Israeli authorities, regardless of the place in which they relocated following the demolition.
10. **People affected by demolitions:** includes all people that benefited from a demolished structure (as a source of income, to receive a service, etc), excluding those displaced.

Access West Bank

11. **Permanently staffed checkpoints:** staffed by Israeli security personnel, excluding checkpoints located on the Green Line and ‘agricultural gates’ along the Barrier.
12. **Partially staffed checkpoints:** checkpoint infrastructure staffed on an ad-hoc basis.
13. **Unstaffed obstacles:** includes roadblocks, earthmounds, earth walls, road gates, road barriers, and trenches. For historical reasons, this figure excludes obstacles located within the Israeli-controlled area of Hebron City (H2).
14. **‘Flying’ or random checkpoints:** checkpoints deployed on an ad hoc basis in places without pre-existing infrastructure.

Access to health

15. **Applications for permits to leave Gaza through Erez:** includes only the applications submitted for travel scheduled within the reporting period.
16. **Delayed applications:** includes applications regarding which no answer was received by the date of the medical appointment, thus forcing the patient to restart the application process.

Movement of humanitarian staff

17. **Incidents of delayed or denied access at a WB checkpoint:** includes incidents affecting local or international staff of humanitarian organizations, both UN and international NGOs.

Imports to Gaza

18. **Truckloads by type:** for historical reasons this figure excludes truckloads carrying all types of fuel.

Child Protection

19. Attacks include the targeting of schools that cause the total or partial destruction of such facilities. Other interferences to the normal operation of the facility may also be reported, such as the occupation, shelling, targeting for propaganda of, or otherwise causing harm to school facilities or its personnel.